Police in a Changing Society by Devlin, Patrick Arthur
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 57 | Issue 2 Article 1
1966
Police in a Changing Society
Patrick Arthur Devlin
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal
Justice Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Patrick Arthur Devlin, Police in a Changing Society, 57 J. Crim. L. Criminology & Police Sci. 123 (1966)
THr JouNAL o CRIINAL LAW, CRIMINOLOGY AND POLICE SCIENCE
Copyright @ 1966 by Northwestern University School of Law
Vol. 57, No. 2
Printed in U.S.A.
The Journal of
CRIMINAL LAW, CRIMINOLOGY AND POLICE SCIENCE
Copyright © by Northwestern University School of Law
VOL 57 JUNE 1966 NO. 2
THE POLICE IN A CHANGING SOCIETY
PATRICK ARTHUR DEVLIN
The author is the Rt. Hon. Lord Devlin, a jurist widely acclaimed throughout the English speaking
world. From 1960-61 he served as Lord Justice of Appeal, and from 1961-64 as a Lord of Appeal in
Ordinary. He is the author of a number of books, among which are: Trial by Jury; The Criminal
Prosecittion in England; and The Enforcement of Morals. He holds the honorary degree of Doctor of
Laws from the University of Glasgow and the University of Toronto.
His present article is the Frank Newsam Memorial Lecture which he delivered on December 9,
1965 at the Police College in Bramshill. It was originally published in the February, 1966 number
of the Police Journal of England, to which we are grateful for this reprint privilege.-EDIoR.
No one can doubt that the last half century has
seen a marked change in the character of our
society. In this respect it is comparable with the
half century that succeeded the Industrial Revolu-
tion. By comparison the 19th century was a period
of stability. If we compare our society to-day with
the society that existed before 1914, and if we
regard the period between the two wars as a
plateau at the half-way level, we can see what the
change has been. The object of this lecture does
not require me to examine the whole of this change
which would indeed be a subject for many volumes
but to examine it only in so far as it affects the
police.
One great change has been the diminution in the
respect for authority. I do not propose to examine
how that has come about or to offer any opinion
as to whether it is a good or a bad thing. Some may
say that it follows naturally on the spread of
education and that people now exercise the power
which education gives them to think things out for
themselves and consequently to question what
hitherto they have taken for granted. The ordinary
man is now not only far better educated than he
was, he is also more prosperous; and prosperity
makes for independence. Independence is in itself a
good thing. But some would say that with indi-
viduals as with nations it has in the 20th century
come too quickly and that men have learnt to
resent control before they have learnt to control
themselves.
This new factor does not create problems that
are peculiar to the police. It affects all those whose
business it is to uphold authority, schoolmasters
and parents among others. It has had a significant
effect upon industrial discipline. Greater prosperity
and fuller employment have weakened the au-
thority of the employer. He cannot now rely as he
used to do on the threat of the sack. Managers and
foremen have had to learn new techniques of
industrial leadership so as to get the results they
want. To this extent the remedy is in their own
hands.
But in the case of the police the remedy is not in
their own hands. It is not part of their function, as
it is that of parents and teachers and managers, to
exhort and to persuade. That is a duty which they
must leave to others to discharge. When it comes to
society as a whole the enforcement of discipline on
its members and the teaching of them to discipline
themselves belong to different organs. In most
periods of our history self-discipline has been
nurtured by religious teaching. The new thinking
which has diminished the power of the churches
has not yet evolved anything to put in its place.
This factor reacts upon the police in another
way. From the economic point of view as well as
from the social the policeman's position is no longer
as commanding as it used to be. It has not got quite
the social prestige that it used to have; and a secure
employment with a pension and other like benefits
is to-day the rule instead of the exception. The
police now suffer from what seems to be a perma-
nent shortage of man-power.
Next I should note, as a change that has affected
the police, the increasing complexity of society.
The simplicity of the criminal law has gone. The
main task of the police half a century ago was to
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protect society against its enemies. Not all crimi-
nals were dangerous men who enjoyed crime. I call
them the enemies of society because they were men
who would not or could not accept the restraints
that society places upon the individual. They were
men who were against the law.
But now we have a large number of social
regulations which have been put upon the police to
enforce. Those who break them I shall call
"offenders", for in the bulk,-though one must
make exceptions for a few very bad cases,-they
are not real criminals but generally law-abiding
members of society. This change in the function of
the police has, I think, profoundly affected their
relations with the public. The shepherd and the
sheepdog are no longer employed simply to beat off
the wolves. The sheep are no longer allowed to
graze freely wherever they will. Their grazing is
now strictly controlled and those that stray are
harried by the sheepdog. The sheepdog is no longer
seen simply as the benevolent protector; and some
sheep-no doubt the more troublesome ones-
begin to have a sneaking sympathy for the wolf.
A fourth change is the increase in serious crime.
Again, I am not going to attempt to analyse the
causes of the increase and I direct attention only to
one aspect of it and that is its change in character.
The Great Train Roberry has brought it home to us
all that the police are now having to fight organized
crime on a scale that is new. These men have done
more than reject social obligations; they have
declared war on society.
These being the factors of change, what is being
done to adapt the work of the police? I have no
doubt that in the internal organization of the force
a great deal has been and is being done. I am not
qualified to comment on that. I can comment only
on one aspect and that is the criminal law. But the
criminal law, in so far as it affects the work of the
police, adapted itself to meet the needs of our
present society.
First, I shall suggest a long-term change that I
think we might begin at least to think about. We
should try to get back to the fundamental idea that
the police are a body that exists to deal with real
crime, that the duties they are given to do in
connection with the enforcement of social regula-
tions are foreign to their nature and that the less
they have to deal with them the better. The
tendency to heap all law enforcement on to the
police as a matter of course is something that
should be checked.
For one thing it is a waste of highly-trained
man-power when man-power is short. You do not
need a man trained in unarmed combat for keeping
order in the classroom. Summonses can be served
by men who would not be quite up to making
arrests. But the more important thing is that the
police are continually being brought into disagree-
ment and conflict with fundamentally law-abiding
members of the public on whose cooperation they
must rely in the fight against real crime. Offences
against social discipline should be dealt with in the
same way as offences against professional or
industrial discipline-by tribunals with powers to
fine or suspend or disqualify. It is oppressive to
bear down on the offender with the whole weight of
the criminal law, to hale him before what he still
thinks of as a "police court" and to threaten him
with imprisonment. The threat of imprisonment,
although statistically very remote for social
offences, may seem a grim and terrifying thing
when it is hanging over a man's head for weeks and
months; and the police as the agents of law enforce-
ment are taken to personify the sense of oppression
that it brings.
One of the greatest sources of friction is the
administration of the traffic laws. The people who
have to administer them are bound to leave a
number of grievances in their wake, real or
imagined, grievances that get magnified into
resentment. It would now be a major operation to
disentangle the police completely from activity in
even minor breaches of the traffic laws. But is it
necessary to identify the police as closely as they
are identified with their enforcement? Must they
be prosecutors as well as witnesses? The role of the
policeman in civil proceedings arising out of motor
car accidents is not resented because there is no
feeling that he is engaged on one side or the other.
He is the impartial witness. Could he not play the
same role in a criminal case? The decision whether
or not to prosecute, the interviewing of witnesses,
the preparation of the case and its conduct in
court, all this could be done by men or women who
would have no need of the qualifications-the
physical qualifications, let alone those of another
sort-which the policeman has to have. There
would then be no feeling that the police were
professionally interested in obtaining a conviction.
There would not then be engendered the sort of
hostility that arises out of a clash in court. A
defendant in a civil case may be very angry with
the plaintiff whom he may feel has distorted the
case against him and very angry with the plaintiff's
counsel who he thinks has cross-examined him
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harshly or unfairly. But he is not usually indignant
with the independent witness.
Driving after too much to drink is, I think, one
of the worst of traffic offences and so I take it
deliberately as an illustration. There are drunken
drivers who are criminals in every sense of the
word. But they are in the small minority. For the
ordinary man this law is a stiff law. A man whose
ability to drive is impaired through drink commits
an offence and under modem conditions ability to
drive is impaired if the power to judge distances
correctly or the power to react swiftly is impaired.
This is a necessary law, but it is a hard one and its
stringent enforcement is bound to be disliked. It
means that in country districts where a car is a
necessity a man must stop short of what in other
circumstances makes an innocent and convivial
evening. The police rightly take a stem view of the
law, while the public continues to think of a
drunken driver in the terms of the old law as a man
who is so much under the influence of drink that he
is incapable of controlling the car at all.
Imprisonment, though heavily threatened, is
rarely used-for about two percent of those
charged. Ninety percent at least of offenders
against this and other traffic laws could be ade-
quately dealt with by a licensing authority. There
is no God-given right to drive a motorcar on the
highway any more than there is to navigate a ship
on the sea, pilot an aeroplane, keep a public house
or put on a theatrical performance. Yet any
dangerous or drinking driver can ensure that for
him the only licensing authority is the jury. It is
not the jury's fault; they are not cut out for the
job. Looking at it frankly and not traditionally,
have you heard of anything more absurd than that
with the road accident rate as it is a man should go
on driving on the highway until the point comes
when each one of 12 men or women, who will be
told nothing about the number of times he may
have offended before, are convinced beyond
reasonable doubt that he is unsafe? In these cases
the machinery of the criminal law is not merely
unnecessarily used; it is when used hopelessly
ineffective. The police are given the difficult task
of trying to enforce it and suffer the discourage-
ment of frequent failure.
Now may I pass to another aspect of the criminal
law. I imagine that the shortage of manpower in
the police results in reviews being made from time
to time of police duties so as to eliminate as far as
possible waste of time. Has it ever been considered
what alterations might be made in our criminal
procedure so as to eliminate waste of time by the
public as a whole, but especially by the police? Of
course if all criminal procedure is regarded as
sacred ritual, that is an end to the matter. A church
service cannot be cut in length because of the
shortage of parsons. But our civil procedure has
been overhauled more than once in my lifetime in
the law; and while conceding that nothing is a
waste of time which is needed to guard against the
danger of an erroneous conviction I think that our
criminal procedure would benefit from similar
treatment. It is still based upon the archaic notion
that everything must be done by word of mouth. Is
there any reason why proceedings should not be
shortened by means of written admissions? Why
is a police officer who has made a plan or taken a
photograph always required to produce it in
person? These are some of many questions that I
should like to see examined and answered.
But the biggest time-waster of all, which makes
the others seem puny by comparison, is our pro-
cedure for committal for trial. It is of course
necessary that there should be some preliminary
proceeding by which the circumstances of the
crime are investigated before the accused is
brought to trial. In the earliest days this was done
by the grand jury. Then the task was taken over by
magistrates. What they do now as a mere for-
mality, the taking of depositions, was until the
early days of the last century, before police forces
were organized, a real inquiry; finding out who were
the relevant witnesses, and getting down their
statements in writing. Now the real work is all
done in advance by the police and the proceedings
before the "examining justices" as they are still
called, are in most cases a tedious and time-wasting
ceremonial. The witness is required to repeat his
statement, as near as he can remember it, by the
laborious process of question and answer. In the
case of a police officer or an expert witness much of
it consists in reading out his notes at subdictation
speed so that they can be copied out in longhand.
It is fair to point out in many courts the quill pen
is falling into disuse. Methods now vary from the
dictating machine in the most affluent jurisdictions
to an antiquated and clacking typewriter in the
more poverty-stricken places. Proceedings always
take hours; and sometimes days and weeks during
which witnesses, always including two or three
police officers, brought from all over the country
may be kept hanging about. Moreover there are
cases-sexual cases in particular-in which the
giving of evidence in public is a trying ordeal for a
1966]
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witness. Something has recently been done to
spare a child the double ordeal. But what good
purpose is served by embarrassing a woman who
has been a victim of a sexual assault by making
her describe in public twice over exactly what
happened to her?
What emerges at the end of the ceremonial is a
bundle of statements which could just as easily
have been handed over to the defence at the
beginning. In the rare cases where it is contended
that there is no case fit for trial, the point could be
determined by a Judge or magistrate on this
written material. So could any question of bail,
where the strength of the case is not usually the
deciding factor.
If anyone thinks that this alteration to the law
would result in any injustice to an accused, let him
ask himself if he knows of a single case of injustice
thereby caused in Scotland, where there have never
been committal proceedings at all. In England on
the other hand, because of committal proceedings,
we are faced with the danger that injustice may be
caused to the accused by the preliminary publica-
tion of the prosecution's case against him-
including perhaps evidence that may be rejected
at the trial. That is a question that has been
actively debated for the last seven years without
any satisfactory solution being found for it.
Now let me consider a matter that goes right to
the heart of the criminal law, that is, the degree of
protection which is given to the accused. This
protection is not part of any logical pattern. The
object of a trial is of course to strike a fair balance
between the parties, but no one has ever attempted
to strike the balance between prosecution and
defence on any sort of scientific principle. The
many safeguards which the accused now enjoys
have grown up haphazardly, nearly all of them in
the last 150 years. They grew up in a system in
which before their birth all the advantages had
been on the side of the prosecution. Many of them
constituted the judicial response to the savagery of
the criminal law which Parliament was slow to
alter. Hanging was the penalty prescribed for every
felony. The Judges were determined to make sure
that no man should hang on a bare probability and
so they insisted on proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Until after 1800, both sides came into court
ignorant of the other's case. All that the defence
knew was to be found in the indictment, which at
first he was allowed to look at only and then
eventually was provided with a copy. The Judges
gradually forced the prosecution to disclose their
case in advance but, perhaps because they were
looking for ways of diminishing the power of the
prosecution and looking only for that, they never
made any similar requirement of the defence. The
Judges' Rules grew up towards the end of the
period, but they originated at a time when the
prisoner was not allowed to give evidence and
when it was comparatively rare for him to have any
legal advice or representation. Has not the time
come when we should take a new look at our
criminal procedure in the light of modern condi-
tions and see whether as a whole it is really
designed to achieve the great double objective of
freeing the innocent and punishing the guilty?
The accused is given two fundamental safe-
guards. The first is trial by jury. It is a great
protection to the man in the dock that the prosecu-
tion must convince 12 of his fellow-citizens of his
guilt before he can be punished. There can be no
doubt that if the prosecution had only to convince a
Judge or a bench of Judges there would be fewer
acquittals. I shall not argue about whether trial by
jury is superior to trial by Judge; there are points
to be made on both sides. Much depends on the
quality of the Judges and that can vary from
century to century. The supreme importance of the
jury is that it is the ultimate guarantee of liberty.
It ensures that no man can be imprisoned through
the apparatus of the State or upon the decision of
what we have come to call the Establishment but
only by the verdict of his fellows. In the interests of
a strict enforcement of the law we have permitted
some encroachment on that principle. We should
permit no more. It is not as if we could be assured
of any infallible system of justice which would
inevitably convict all the guilty and acquit all the
innocent. This being so, I should not support the
substitution of lawyers' justice for popular justice
simply because it might result in the acquittal of a
smaller number of those who are probably guilty.
That brings me straight to the second funda-
mental safeguard which also I should not like to see
altered. Why do I talk of those who are "probably
guilty" being acquitted? Because that is the
inevitable result of the principle that requires
guilt to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In
the civil courts as between plaintiff and defendant
the issue depends on the balance of probabilities.
Sometimes the balance may be a comparatively
slender one-60 to 40 or even 51 to 49. To convict
a man because the scales are tilted against him
would under ordinary conditions be to run too
great a risk of the innocent being punished. So we
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require that guilt must be proved beyond reason-
able doubt. But that very fact means that a sub-
stantial number of people who are probably guilty
must go free. I would not have this altered because
I do not see any alternative that would not too
gravely imperil the innocent.
But if these fundamentals are secured, how much
further do we have to go? We should then have a
system under which no man could be convicted
unless 12 men and women, taken at random from
the community, are unanimously convinced that
there is no reasonable doubt about his guilt. Ought
we to go further and try to devise a system that
makes it humanly impossible for any innocent man
ever to be convicted? If we must face the fact that
for the protection of the innocent a large number of
guilty must go free, we must also face the fact that
for the preservation of law and order an innocent
man may occasionally be convicted. I know it is a
terrible thing if by a mistake an innocent man is
imprisoned. But terrible things happen in this
world. The misfortune of such a man would be no
greater than that of a man who through the mis-
take of another is maimed for life. The only
argument for the abolition of capital punishment
that has always seemed to me, so far as it went, to
be unanswerable is the argument that a conviction
might be mistaken. For such a mistake can never be
put right and for death there is no compensation.
If in addition to the requirement that guilt must
be proved beyond reasonable doubt, there is some
further test that could be devised to diminish the
chance of an innocent man being convicted without
increasing the number of probably guilty who are
acquitted, it would be well worth examination. But
I doubt if the few examples-as many as time
permits-that I shall now consider would pass such
a test.
First, there is the rule that an accused's bad
character may not ordinarily be mentioned. This
rule is not rooted in the English common law. It
was one of those that grew up in the 19th century.
Where, as in the United States, the common law
was transplanted before the growth, it is not
generally observed. In England the principle is to
treat bad character as generally irrelevant and to
allow evidence of it only in exceptional circum-
stances. This seems to me to be fundamentally
wrong. Outside a law court one of the first things
that anybody would want to know about a man
before he believed him guilty of a serious offence
would be what sort of man he was-whether he had
done the same sort of thing before and whether he
was the sort of person whose reputation showed
that he could be believed. This rule surely ought to
be the other way round, viz that character is some-
thing that is always relevant but that evidence of
bad character should be excluded where the
relevance is slight and the effect mainly prejudicial.
A jury is more likely to be prejudiced than a
judge, or at any rate is less well trained in ex-
cluding prejudice from its calculations. It is
therefore a necessary protection for an accused and
one that goes with jury trial that there should be
rules excluding what is mainly prejudicial. But
under our present rules we carry this to fantastic
lengths. Suppose, for example, the issue is one of
identity and the prisoner says that he was not at
the scene of the crime on the Wednesday when it
was committed. Where was he, it will be asked.
Suppose he says that he was in Liverpool where he
went on the Monday. Suppose the prosecution
knows that that must be untrue because he only
came out of prison on the Tuesday. Can they put
that to him? No, because it would reveal that he
was a person of bad character. This is ridiculous.
Then let us consider the prisoner's right to keep
silent. I should maintain as fundamental the rule
that the prosecution must prove its case without
the assistance of the prisoner. If the prosecution
was allowed to bring a case on suspicion only and to
base their chances of conviction on the hope that
they would get something out of the prisoner in
cross-examination, it could lead far too easily to
injustice. But if the prisoner keeps silent when
there is obviously something for him to explain-
whether at the time of arrest or at the time of
trial-and where an innocent man would be likely
to speak, I do not see why silence should not be
commented upon and used strongly against him.
Then there is the contrast between the prosecu-
tion's duty to put all its cards on the table and the
defence's right to keep theirs face down. It seems
now to be accepted as a sort of honourable tradition
that the prosecution must be ready to meet any
case which the defence puts up and that it would
lose face if it asked for an adjournment. Sometimes
it is a gamble with time. If the prosecution first
hears an alibi when the prisoner goes infto* the box
on Monday morning it may be quite impossible to
check it before the conclusion of the trial. But if he
is unlucky and finishes his evidence in chief on
Friday afternoon the police can work overtime on
Saturday and Sunday and he may find himself
faced with a devastating cross-examination on the
Monday morning.
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One other point I should like to touch on and
that is the definition of police powers in relation in
particular to the powers of arrest, search and
detention. It is quite extraordinary that in a
country which prides itself on individual liberty
these should be so obscure and ill-defined. It is
useless to complain of policemen overstepping the
mark if it takes a day's research to find out where
the mark is. Where powers are necessary the police
should have them; and they should not have to
rely upon the willingness of the law-abiding to
submit voluntarily. The phrase "would you care
to?", as a preliminary to a question, must be
taught at Bramshill with the same assiduity as the
schoolboy learns the French "est-ce-que".
Reform of the law is not a subject that is usually
attractive to governments. Whatever his political
allegiance may be, a lawyer must give great credit
to the present government for tackling seriously
the reform of the civil law. I hope that it may be
able to turn its attention with equal seriousness to
the criminal law. Reform there is a social rather
than a legal matter. It has become an urgent social
necessity that time-wasting procedures and tradi-
tional ideas which impede the conviction of the
guilty should be swept away.
I have indicated several points at which the
criminal law and its administration affect the
relationship between the police and the public.
There is another factor to be mentioned which has
nothing to do with criminal administration, unless
perhaps it can be partly explained, though hardly
excused, by a sense of frustration that has grown
up in the police because of the feeling that in law
the odds are always against them. A series of
incidents over the last few years, some of them very
grave indeed, have made the public suspicious of
police integrity. The reputation of the police still
stands high. It has not been injured at the core but
undoubtedly the skin has been severely bruised.
Any degree of suspicion is dangerous because it
feeds on the natural fear of arbitrary power.
May I draw a comparison which at first sight
may seem to you to be quite fanciful but which I
believe has an essential validity, a comparison
between the power of the police and the power of
the press? The sources of the two powers are
diametrically opposite. The source of the police
power is the need for authority and the fear is that
it may be used despotically. The source of the
press power is the need for freedom and the fear is
that it may be used licentiously. The law seeks to
control the power of arrest and detention but its
abuse by an irresponsible policeman is terrifying to
contemplate. The power to print is controlled by
the law of libel; but the abuse of power, even within
the law, by an irresponsible pressman could hurt
the individual more cruelly than bodily punishment
and could do grave damage to the national interest.
For these two very different reasons it is easy to
create hostility to the police and to the press,
twin hostilities that have the same root, the fear of
the abuse of power. They thrive on incidents which
are too easily taken as symptomatic of a general
disease rather than of a local sore. Fear of power is
an emotional instinct. It is unreasoning emotion
that damns the police (or the press) as a whole for
the misconduct of a fraction of their number. Fear
prompts the question, very difficult to answer
satisfactorily: "If this sort of thing can happen
once, how can we be sure that it is not happening
all the time?"
I believe that there is only one satisfactory
answer to that question. From what I have read, it
is not an answer that will at first hearing commend
itself to you. Nevertheless, I shall make bold to
give it in the hope that you may consider it further.
The answer is the unlimited reception of all com-
plaints and their consideration by a body on which
the public is represented. It is the only way of
washing out of the public mind the suspicion that
somewhere things are wrong. The most painstaking
investigations by the police themselves will never
do that.
There can be no body of men in the world which
enjoys having its workings subjected to outside
examination. Why in the case of the police do I
think it necessary? All professions nowadays have
machinery for investigating complaints against
their members; but most, like barristers, solicitors
and doctors, do it by a domestic tribunal. But the
police-and the press too-are more than profes-
sions. Abuse of a professional privilege by a doctor
or a lawyer cannot be compared with the abuse of
power.
It is not necessary to hand over the whole duty
of inquiry to an outside body. Here again may I
make a last comparison with the press and invite
you to consider the experiment that is there being
tried. The Press Council consists of 80 percent
pressmen and 20 percent laymen. No journalist can
fear that his actions will be reviewed by a body
which does not understand the nature of his work
or, it may be, the difficulties and temptations which
he has to surmount. If the lay element was to act as
a bloc, which in fact it never does, it could affect
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the result only if there was a serious division of
professional opinion. But the presence of the lay
element in the council is the public's guarantee,
not only that its viewpoint is presented and con-
sidered but also that the processes of inquiry
employed and the general pattern of results are
subjected to independent scrutiny. The public
knows that it is inconceivable that men of inde-
pendence would continue to participate in pro-
ceedings conducted on a narrow or professional
basis. It eliminates the suspicion, I am not calling
it a well-founded suspicion, that doesn't matter, it
is the fact that it is there, that dirty linen may re-
main unwashed.
Will not there be, you may ask, bagfuls of
complaints by cranks and mischief-makers and
people whose nature it is to complain about every-
thing? Certainly there will be. You might as well
ask:-"If I catch cold, will there be running at the
nose?" It is one of the things you have to put up
with. An independent element can be much more
drastic in dealing with such complaints than the
police themselves can afford to be. Just because
they could be accused of a one-sided attitude, the
police may feel bound to investigate all such
complaints meticulously. The public will accept a
procedure which throws out insubstantial com-
plaints if they are vetted independently, not other-
wise.
Do you sometimes ask yourself, those of you
who know that you are giving of your best for
incommensurate rewards, whether it is all worth
while? The British people are hard taskmasters.
They have from the earliest times had a love of
freedom which has expressed itself in an intolerance
of tyranny and at the same time a desire for order
and good government which they know is un-
obtainable without respect for the law. Respect is
the word. One must not expect them to be affec-
tionate to those whose duty it is to enforce the
law. I know that a grudging respect is a poor return
for the sort of service the police are asked to give.
Yet it is because the British have learnt to measure
out stingily their grants of authority, so that it is
just enough and no more, that they have, perhaps
more successfully than any other nation, held the
balance between order and freedom. The police
power oscillates uncomfortably at the point of
balance and this is what gives every policeman an
exacting task. But the British way of life depends
to a great extent on the way in which he discharges
it.
19661
